EUSEBIO
M. BARON, A.M. No.
P-04-1816
Complainant, (Formerly OCA-IPI
No. 03-1747-P)
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
PUNO,
- versus -
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
EMILADIE
T. ANACAN, CARPIO-MORALES,
Court
Stenographer III, CALLEJO, SR.,
RTC-Branch
45,
Occidental
Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
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D E C I S I O N
Tinga, J.:
The
image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise,
of the personnel who work thereat. Thus, the conduct of a person serving the
judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and
above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the
public for the judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or
omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will
violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to
diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary.[1]
These
were our words in a prior case also involving herein respondent where the Court
admonished her to be more prudent in her dealings with others and sternly
warned her that any similar infractions shall be dealt with more severely. This
time, the Court, in keeping with its earlier admonition, imposes a penalty
commensurate to the grossly reproachable conduct of respondent.
The
facts of the case follow.
On
Complainant
alleged that he owned a parcel of land adjacent to the properties of his
brother and his father. All these properties were expropriated by the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) in line with its road widening
project in Bubog,
Complainant
narrated that as he was following up the payment for the expropriated lands, he
was approached by respondent who offered her services to expedite complainant’s
claim, as she supposedly had connections with the DPWH. Knowing respondent to
be an employee of the RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, complainant consented to her proposition.
For
the services of respondent, complainant agreed to pay her 40% of the total
gross payment from the government for the lands expropriated as service fee. It
was also agreed that respondent would in turn shoulder the expenses for the
transfer of the title such as tax on capital gains, notarial fees, registration
fees or transfer taxes, and the like.
Subsequently,
the DPWH District Office of Mamburao released a check for P3,178,000.00
in favor of complainant. Respondent informed complainant of the check payment. As complainant encashed the check at the bank,
respondent demanded P1,353,474.00, representing the 40% service fee per
her computation. Despite his protest, complainant was constrained to give the sums respondent
had asked for as they were already creating a scene in the bank.
Months
after, complainant received a letter from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
demanding payment of the capital gains tax for the sale of the three (3) properties
to the government. Based on the letter,
complainant recomputed the 40% share charged by the respondent and
realized that respondent had overcharged him by P82,274.00. Complainant
later on also learned that the charges incident to the transfer of the
properties from the original owners, i.e.
complainant, his brother and father, to the government had remained unpaid. As
a result, he sent a letter[3] to
respondent reminding her of the unpaid transfer charges and complaining of the overcharging she had made. Respondent
sent a reply letter[4]
acknowledging the receipt of the 40% service fee. In addition, respondent
contended that she had already given half of the amount for the capital gains
tax to complainant’s wife. The latter denied having received the alleged
remittance.[5]
Thus, the instant complaint. Complainant
has also since filed a case of grave misconduct and estafa against respondent
with the Office of the Ombudsman.
In her Comment,[6]
respondent denied having approached the complainant. She maintained that it was
through a certain Cecilia Gordovez that respondent knew about the need of
complainant for her services to facilitate the processing of his claim of
payment for the expropriated lands. Since at that time, respondent was also
working for the payments of the lots of other persons, she accepted complainant’s engagement of her services, with complainant
voluntarily agreeing to give 40% from the gross payments of the three lots as
commission or working fee. She claimed that the capital gains and transfer
taxes, as well as the notarial fee, were not covered in the 40% commission.
Complainant further averred that the remittance
of the 40% fee was not obtained through force or intimidation and that she
never used nor made as her “shelve” her status as a court employee.
Meanwhile, on
On
In a Resolution dated
After investigating the case, the parties
were required to file their respective position papers[10]
but only complainant complied with the directive of the investigating judge.
On
Respondent has had two other
administrative complaints lodged against her.[13] One is still pending with the OCA. In the other,
Prak v. Anacan,[14] the Court admonished respondent for conduct
prejudicial to the service. Interestingly, that case likewise involved the
assistance extended by respondent for the release of sums for just compensation
from the DPWH in connection with an expropriation case involving a
road-widening project in Barangay Bubog,
The incident
in Prak concerned a
similar facilitation arrangement involving another property in the same
locality which was expropriated for the
same road-widening project. The Court observed then that while respondent’s
acts therein were not connected to her official duties she should have exercised
prudence in dealing with people. The Court pertinently noted then that
“employees of the judiciary must be wary, and should ‘tread carefully’ when
assisting other persons, even if such assistance sought would call for the
exercise of acts unrelated to their official functions,” adding that “(s)uch
assistance should not in any way compromise the public's trust in the justice
system.”[15]
The Court in Prak warned
respondent that future similar violations on her part would be dealt with more
severely.[16] There
are indeed similarities between Prak and this case. The two cases share
a common time frame and both involve expropriation resorted to for a road
widening project in Barangay Bubog,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. While there is no certainty on this point, it is
highly likely that the properties in Prak and herein complainant’s properties were
subjected to the same order of expropriation. The relatively benign treatment
accorded respondent in Prak might falsely imply tolerance on the part
of the Court over respondent’s activities before the DPWH. Yet in this case,
the culpabilities established before us sufficiently warrant the imposition of
the penalty of suspension for (1) one
year, instead of six (6) months only as recommended both by the investigating
judge and the OCA.
Generally, the Court frowns upon
“moonlighting” activities of court employees. In Hipolito v. Mergas,[17]
the Court called to task a sheriff for improperly facilitating an application
for a small scale mining permit with the Bureau of Mines, such extraneous
activities being tantamount to a failure
“to observe and maintain that degree of dedication to the duties and
responsibilities required of [therein respondent] as a deputy sheriff.”[18]
While “moonlighting” is not normally considered a serious misconduct,
nonetheless, by the very nature of the position held, it amounts to a
malfeasance in office.[19]
In Benavidez v. Vega,[20]
the Court suspended a court stenographer for one month for her moonlighting
activities, which involved the facilitation of the issuance of permits from
Many “moonlighting” activities pertain to
legal acts that otherwise would be countenanced if the actors were not
otherwise employed in the public sector. Yet “moonlighting” as an
administrative offense becomes a higher species of offense if the
extra-official acts involved are likewise tainted with illegality.
It is clear, from the facts of this case
and in Prak, that respondent has
been offering her assistance to property owners whose lands have been
expropriated in obtaining their payment of just compensation from the government
through the DPWH. It is not evident whether such activities are of
long-standing habit on respondent’s part, or in line with the road-widening
project in Barangay Bubog in 2002-2003 due to which the property of
respondent’s uncle, among others, was expropriated. It may have occurred that
respondent’s initial interest was relatively innocuous—facilitating her uncle’s
claim for just compensation; and her facilitation of the other claims arose
incidentally therefrom. Whatever the precise factual backdrop though, the
particular acts highlighted in this case sufficiently establish respondent’s
conduct as prejudicial to the service.
Respondent in this case asked for a commission or
working fee for her services, not only in one instance, but has done so
regularly in several instances with several individuals as admitted by her.
Thus, in her Comment/Answer,[22] she declared that the amount equivalent to
40% of the total payment made by the government to the complainant is a
commission or a working fee, and that she was also working for the payments of
the lots of Mrs. Tomasa and Augusto
Nacar and the lots of Atty. Eriberto and Domingo Palomar.[23] Even in the case of Prak, the conflict
was also DPWH payment facilitation by respondent. Hence, it would seem that respondent has
made it an extra source of income to “fix” the DPWH payments for expropriated
lands for a fee. Without a doubt, respondent has been engaging in “moonlighting,”
which is prohibited by the Court.
A couple of additional factors militates
against respondent’s cause. One is the
enormous amount of commission given to her. The other is the display of her patent gross
character by her not being content in receiving P1,271,200.00 but
overcharging complainant by P82,274.00.
The Court likewise notes that respondent
was not candid in relating her side of the case as she stated in her
Comment/Answer that the 40% commission
excluded the payment of expenses for the transfer of the titles from the name
of complainant, his brother and father to the name of the government. However,
complainant filed his Reply to Comment/Answer of Emiladie Anacan[24]
attaching thereto a Sworn Statement by herein respondent who admitted receiving
40% share in the payment and recognizing her responsibility to pay all the
necessary expenses for the transfer of the title as well as the incidental
expenses such as representation cost for hotel and food bills.[25]
In giving conflicting statements, respondent portrays lack of candor to this
Court that is not only disrespectful but also insolent in the context of the
power of this Court over its personnel.
The Court has repeatedly declared that
the behavior of everyone connected in the dispensation of justice from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Failure to observe this
rule is to erode the dignity and honor of the courts or to lay open to
suspicion the official conduct of their personnel.[26] Thus, in Gotgotao
v. Millora, we held:[27]
The image of a court of
justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the
men and women who work thereat, from the judge to the least and lowest of its
personnel—hence, it becomes the imperative sacred duty of each and everyone in
the court to maintain its good name and standing as a true temple of justice.
The conduct of court personnel at all times must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but also be above suspicion. Thus all court personnel are
enjoined and required to comport themselves in such manner as to avoid any
taint of suspicion being cast on their actuations, official or private.[28]
Respondent has already been admonished
and warned by this Court in her first administrative case. However, she shows
no remorse and instead committed another act which not only affronted
complainant but also disgraced the judiciary, of which she is a part. Her dishonest dealings with complainant; the
conflicting statements she made in her Comment in the present case and the
Sworn Statement in the Ombudsman case; the exorbitant commission she sought
from complainant for the facilitation of the payment from DPWH; and her act in
misappropriating the money which should have been used for the payment of
capital gains and transfer taxes and other expenses for the transfer of title,
if sufficiently proven, constitute the crime of estafa as defined in the
Revised Penal Code. All the foregoing
are aggravated by the fact that respondent was previously admonished by the
Court for a similar behavior. Thus, respondent has clearly demonstrated conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Conduct grossly prejudicial to the best
interest of the service is a grave offense under Section 46, No. 27, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I of Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No.
292), Section 23 (t), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O.
No. 292, and Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 49-89, as incorporated in the
Personnel Manual of the Supreme Court.
The penalty for conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service is suspension for six (6) months, one (1) day to one (1) year, for the
first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the second offense.[29]
As above discussed, the questionable
character of respondent, and whether such is acceptable in a court employee, her
act of overcharging and non-payment of expenses for the transfer of the titles
of complainant, concern the Court. Under the circumstances, the Court is
constrained to impose upon respondent
the penalty of suspension for one (1) year.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, respondent is hereby declared GUILTY of conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and SUSPENDED for a period of
one (1) year, with a stern warning that
the commission of similar or graver offense in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO
MORALES Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate
Justice
[8]In the case cited, the Court held that
“the Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court
personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as
to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.” 305 Phil. 717, 724
(2001).
[13]Three in all, namely: (1) A.M. No.
P-04-1816 entitled Eusebio Baron v.
Emiladie Anacan, the present complaint, (2) IPI-03-1776-P entitled Virginia Gordovez v. Emiladie Anacan
pending in the Office of the Court Administrator for Evaluation Report and
Recommendation, and (3) A.M. No. P-03-1738 entitled Prak v. Anacan promulgated on
[19]